

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-106

20 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Plans Group

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Deputy Director for Community Affairs

SUBJECT: OS Enhanced Package - 1982 Budget Call [REDACTED]

1. You probably have enough ideas for enhanced packages but one more won't hurt. [REDACTED]

2. I had occasion to be interviewed in ODP's certification process of my need for a word-processor. I noted that my request for a Mag Card II instrument was hopefully a stop gap measure until the more sophisticated devices, capable of being networked, came into use by the Agency. My observation fall on uninitiated ears. So I settled for my Mag-Card. [REDACTED]

3. What I had in mind was the Office of Security update to "Today's Environment" using new technology to communicate electrically between Headquarters and the field offices. As I thought further, it seemed to me that there should be a way for OS to get in on the modernization of communications. We now have telephones between our elements in Headquarters and around the Washington area. There are secure phones in most places. We have LDX service to some offices. We have the upcoming cable tie between [REDACTED] and Headquarters. We have the "Smart Phone" system in [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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25X1A 4. I don't think we have yet solved the problem of establishing an Agency standard for word processors or networking of them. However we were informed at the recent ODP briefing that things were on the horizon. Would it be advisable to start now in planning how OS will tie its Headquarters elements together once we move [] but Polygraph and CSG stay in Headquarters, and PTOS and Tech Div stay in [] It would appear that the 1982 Budget Call is a good place to submit a Theme package at least an enhanced level package that will let us work everything together. []

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5. It would appear reasonable to plan now for inclusion in the security package for the move of OS to present a networked NBI system. The NBI system can be tied into the Agency's main frame or certainly some of its more usable files, tied into the 4C, allow real time exchange on Delta Data improved scopes of electrically sent messages (page after page of documents) and could be tied into a line printer that will allow hard copy retention if that is what we want. []

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25X1 6. The problems with networking the field stations aren't that imposing. By 1983 we should have resolved the Tempest issue and the question of whether to lease dedicated lines or use encryption over regular telephone lines. []

7. The proposal would be for the following time phasing and equipment purchase:

By end of year 1982 - [] stations slaved to three different elements of [] to handle OS in-house needs. Each station to have a line printer and CRT. One station will be in the Office of the Director of Security complex. One station will be in the OS Registry in [] the third will be in the Office of DD/PSI. []

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By end of year 1983 - One station consisting of a terminal and printer would be located in the office complex of the DD/PTOS in [] An NBI slave would be put in TSD and another in OSSD or ISG. []

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One station consisting of a terminal and printer should be given to the Polygraph Branch or to SRD (if they too remain) with an NBI slave to the other.

A station, CRT and printer with tie in to SSC and CIB (4C) in should be installed in the office of the DD/CA in the Headquarters complex.



Work should start on examining the value of the 4C system as a source of information for investigating elements of the OS.

Work should also begin on the possibility, feasibility of networking (or capitalizing on the network of the 4C) into the FBI criminal record computer or establishing a terminal connection with the FBI to permit any OS field station to conduct near real time checks with the FBI.



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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-107

20 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
Legal Adviser APEX Steering Group

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FROM:

[REDACTED]
Security Adviser APEX Steering Group

SUBJECT:

Charter Legislation, Title VI
National Security Agency

1. I refer you to my memorandum of 5 February 1980 (SECOM D-074) in which I addressed serious concern about the diverse and uneven authorities of the DNI and DIRNSA as expressed in the Administration draft charter legislation.

2. I have just read a copy of the SSCI proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980 and my concern has been heightened.

3. The authorities for the DNI (Sec 412 (j)) are here cited as:

"The Director shall be responsible for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods and shall establish for departments and agencies minimum security standards for the management and handling of information and material relating to intelligence sources and methods." (underscoring added)

4. Again, I believe strongly that this does not reflect the spirit or letter of Executive Branch pronouncements. "...Minimum security standards" is weaker than the Administration's proposal for "...policy guidance" and significant weaker than the E.O. 12036 requirement that the DCI will:

"Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling intelligence systems, information and products."

5. When the SSCI language is viewed in comparison with the authority provided DIRNSA "to prescribe and enforce for the United States signals intelligence system... security rules regulations, procedures, standards and requirements with respect to personnel security clearances, authorizations for access to facilities and information, physical security of facilities, equipment and information and the transmission, processing and reporting of information, in order to protect signals intelligence... from unauthorized disclosure," it is evident that DIRNSA has the authority to ignore any DNI security pronouncement if in the perception of the DIRNSA it is not sufficient to satisfy security needs to protect signals intelligence.

6. Further, I am appalled by the language in this section that clearly gives the DIRNSA authority to enforce "all such rules regulations, procedures, standards and requirements" outside NSA, throughout the government as long as such enforcement "shall be coordinated with the head of each concerned department or agency." There is no provision for concerned departments or agencies to moderate or rejoin discussions against such enforcement. All they can do is "coordinate."

7. Lastly, this proposed legislation mandates that "the heads of all departments and agencies shall furnish the Director (NSA) upon request and in accordance with applicable law, such data as the Director (NSA) may require" to assist in the fulfillment of these responsibilities.

8. These authorities are certainly incompatible with the letter of 10 January 1980 PD/NSC-55 which says the APEX Special Access Control System will be implemented by the DCI as the NSC's Executive Agent. I think we all agree that the signals intelligence system falls within the purview of APEX.

9. I am mindful of your advice to restrain from making this an issue before the full Security Committee and to not propose a concerted approach to the Hill committees on intelligence. Your advice was predicated on Mr. Silver's expressed willingness to get the NSA to explain their intent. I do not feel that your advice now pertains. This is not an Administration proposed bill. Discussions with NSA as to intent while interesting would not carry the same weight over time if this bill passes.

10. History of dealings with NSA clearly fail to support a claim that this type language poses no threat to the security responsibilities and authorities of the DCI in terms of E.O. 12036, the charter of PD/NSC-55.

11. Accordingly, by copy of this memorandum I intend to inform the Security Committee Members of my concerns and seek concerted action by whatever means to redress the issue.

12. Toward this end, I offer the attached proposed wording and noted changes in substitution of these two sections.

13. In view of the DCI proposed hearings, I request that you bring this matter to the attention of the DCI with the assurances that the Security Committee Members, except NSA, endorse the proposed changes.




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Attachment

Distribution:

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